(Phnom Penh): At a time when the United States speaks of the need for regional stability, and when China calls on both sides to exercise restraint and engage in dialogue, the sound of weapons continues to echo along the Cambodia–Thailand border.
Civilian lives remain under constant threat, and Cambodia’s cultural heritage continues to face grave danger.
Against this reality, a serious question has emerged in public discourse:
Why has the war not yet ended, even though major powers have already expressed their desire to see peace between the two countries?
What, then, is the real key to ending the conflict—political will, coercive power, or the cost of violations?
The uncomfortable truth is that wars rarely end because of goodwill alone, even when that goodwill comes from major powers. War ends only when such willingness is translated into concrete pressure and tangible costs imposed on the violating party. In the Cambodia–Thailand conflict, both the United States and China may genuinely wish to see peace, but they must also weigh their own strategic interests. As a result, “peace” has remained largely a matter of diplomatic rhetoric rather than a reality enforced on the ground.
Political Will Is Not the Same as Political Responsibility
Major powers may declare their desire for peace, but they are often unwilling to pay the full political price required to enforce it. Phone calls, official statements, and appeals for “restraint” can help shape diplomatic tone and open channels for dialogue, but they are insufficient to silence gunfire in the absence of coercive or deterrent measures tied to real costs.
In diplomacy, statements may carry symbolic weight—but enforcement carries decisive power.
The Simplest Explanation: The Violating Party Has Not Yet Paid a Real Price
Wars persist not because of misunderstanding, but because one party believes it can continue violating norms without suffering serious consequences. When there are no meaningful sanctions, no loss of international legitimacy, and no clear economic penalties, diplomatic language alone has little impact.
Peace becomes possible only when continuing the war costs more than stopping it. This occurs when military losses mount, economic pressure intensifies, political credibility erodes, and international reputation deteriorates—at which point peace is no longer an abstract ideal, but a rational necessity.
China Wants Peace—but Is Constrained by Its Own Strategic Interests
From Beijing’s perspective, an armed conflict between Cambodia and Thailand is not an opportunity but a strategic risk. China finds itself caught between two inseparable interests:
- Cambodia, a trusted political partner with close diplomatic, economic, and military ties;
- Thailand, a vital economic artery and a key logistics gateway for regional connectivity and long-distance transport projects that China views as strategically important.
Thailand’s practice of diplomatic “flexibility”—maintaining close ties with China while also sustaining security relations with the United States—further complicates Beijing’s calculations. This reality prevents China from fully siding with either party:
- Supporting Cambodia too strongly risks pushing Thailand entirely into the U.S. strategic orbit;
- Supporting Thailand too openly risks undermining China’s credibility with Cambodia and other partners.
As a result, China has largely opted for crisis management rather than choosing sides—seeking to extinguish the flames quickly to protect its own interests, not to secure a decisive victory for either party.
Crisis management, however, is not the same as conflict resolution. It may reduce tensions temporarily, but it does not eliminate the root causes of war.
Both Major Powers Want Peace—But Neither Wants Peace to Become a Geopolitical Contest
The United States and China may both want the fighting to subside in order to prevent wider regional instability. At the same time, both are cautious about allowing their involvement to evolve into a visible contest of influence on the global stage.
The result is a familiar pattern: expressions of goodwill, diplomatic engagement, and calls for restraint—without effective enforcement mechanisms capable of compelling compliance on the battlefield.
Conclusion
The Cambodia–Thailand war will not be easy to end as long as the “peaceful intentions” of major powers remain confined to rhetoric and are not transformed into clear, tangible, and unavoidable costs for the violating party.
The conflict can be brought to an end only when three fundamental conditions are genuinely met:
First, violations must carry a high and unavoidable price.
Acts of aggression must not only be halted, but must be accompanied by full accountability, including compensation for damage inflicted on the affected country—ranging from civilian deaths and physical injuries to the destruction of infrastructure, economic losses, and damage to cultural heritage. Violations without consequences invite repetition.
Second, international law and multilateral mechanisms must become the decisive arena.
This means that the use of armed force and military intimidation must be subordinated to the authority of international law. When violations of the laws of war, the protection of civilians, and the safeguarding of cultural heritage are established, decisions can no longer be made through force or unilateral action, but must be addressed through legal forums and the collective mechanisms of the international community.
Third, continuing the conflict must no longer produce tangible benefits.
When war yields no sustainable gains—only mounting military losses, economic damage, loss of legitimacy, and domestic instability—ending the conflict becomes the only rational choice.
For Cambodia, strategic restraint is not surrender. Seeking justice through the rule of law is not weakness.
It is a long-term national defense strategy in a world where peace is not achieved through words or promises alone, but through accountability and the repayment of costs arising from violations of international law.
